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A successful American grand strategy requires a close integration of international and domestic institutions and practices. This Essay explores the vital interdependence of grand strategy and law, both international and domestic. First, it
asks how the United States should formulate its foreign policy strategy by pointing
to the three primary components that must be deployed in tandem to forge a successful American foreign policy—persuasion, inducements, and force. Second, this
Essay shows that in light of the distribution of powers between the president and
Congress, and within the executive branch, the execution of that strategy requires a
high level of bipartisan consensus in favor of an approach that neither disclaims
the use of American power nor solely relies on it. The soundness of this strategy is
tested against the American experience in Iraq and elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION
The continuing failure of US policy in the Middle East has
brought to the fore a major dysfunction at the heart of American
foreign policymaking, which brings with it grave implications for
the stability of the international system. This dysfunction has
manifested as a series of interrelated problems in strategy, domestic politics, and international law. In a sound foreign policy,
like that of the United States during the Cold War, the elements
of strategy, domestic politics, and international law work in
harmony. When they conflict, as they have since the end of the
Cold War, the result is disintegration of both US policy and the
international system as a whole, which then results in everheightening risks for peace and security.
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This Essay examines two key questions. First, the question of
the country’s external role: How should the United States interact
with the rest of the world in terms of both strategy and international law, and should it act as a world leader or as just one nation among equals? Second, the question of internal governance:
How should the United States distribute powers internally
among its various branches of government to fulfill its proper
role in the international arena?
These two questions are interrelated. As demonstrated by
America’s successful Cold War strategy and the Pax Americana
that it nurtured in the free world, an effective grand strategy
rests on persuasion, inducements to key players, and a credible
threat of force.1 Public persuasion—both domestic and international—is needed to create a broad base of support. But you
cannot win over 100 percent of the relevant players by persuasion alone. Persuasion can be effectively deployed only if the
proper inducements, whether financial or military, are supplied
to key players over time. Like all self-enforcing contracts, wavering parties will cooperate only if the gains that they hope to receive from future cooperation exceed the gains that they hope to
receive from defection.2 Persuasion and inducements must in
turn be backed by a credible threat of force against those nations
and groups that threaten us or our allies. Without a concerted effort along all three fronts, American power fragments, and policy
will fall into the familiar trap of making commitments that far
exceed its available resources, a situation that Walter Lippmann
described as a “bankrupt foreign position.”3 A grand strategy
based on the proper mix of persuasion, inducements, and credible
threats of force can be effective only over periods of time that exceed those of any single presidential administration. They therefore must be enshrined in domestic and foreign institutions.
That is the deeper significance of alliance treaties: they are
valuable because they consecrate the marriage of persuasion,
1
See Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush 17–58 (Cornell 2014) (analyzing elements of US policy during the Truman administration, a period “often thought of as the
golden age of American grand strategy”).
2
See Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis L Rev 551, 558–63 (comparing enforcement
difficulties faced by nation-states entering into international agreements to enforcement
difficulties faced by private contracting parties); Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 World Polit 1, 4–11 (1985) (examining
payoff structures that favor international cooperation).
3
Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 43 (Little, Brown 1943).
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inducements, and credible threats of force for the purposes of
both international and domestic law.4 In short, grand strategy
depends on international law to be effective. The reverse is also
true: principles of international law cannot survive unless supported by sound domestic institutions and policies, particularly
of a stable constitutional order. A proper, coherent grand strategy, duly developed within a stable democracy, should define international law, and it should do so in ways that render the
strategy effective.
The relation of grand strategy, domestic politics, and international law described above corresponds to the old order that
relied on American exceptionalism to maintain the international
system during the Cold War. The defense of this position is not
without difficulties. One central premise of formal international
law is the parity and equal dignity of sovereigns in their relations with each other.5 But in our view, that parity leads to a
huge power vacuum that can be filled only if someone—
preferably the United States—takes on extra responsibilities
and exercises additional leadership. This Essay is a defense of
that old order and an exhortation to revive and preserve its essential elements, including, when necessary, the use of preemptive force. Of course, the old order was not without major
flaws—but as we will show, those flaws generally confirm the
insights developed in this Essay.
In Part I, we examine in detail the three key components to
the successful American foreign policy mentioned above—
persuasion, inducements, and force—and discuss why they depend on, and must define, international law. In Part II, we look
at the law of the use of force under the UN system, its implicit
modification by the formation of NATO, and its points of conflict
with the basic elements of a successful foreign policy. In Part III,
we look at the elements of the American Constitution that organize the division of control over foreign policy to show how
these elements create an institutional arrangement that allows
for the formation of a foreign policy that is effective, proactive,
and legitimate.

4
See Andrew G. Long, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kyeonghi Baek, Allying for Peace:
Treaty Obligations and Conflict between Allies, 69 J Polit 1103, 1105–07 (2007).
5
See, for example, Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory.”).
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I. THE THREE PILLARS OF GRAND STRATEGY
Looking globally, the restoration of American influence
abroad requires a three-part strategy: persuasion, inducement,
and force.
The first part of this strategy, persuasion, is to engage in
public debate and general discussion to win over a broad base of
popular support in other countries. That task is never easy, and
it requires a deep understanding of local norms and culture to
succeed. Unless the United States can mobilize a broad base of
popular support, it cannot sustain the policies that are needed to
protect itself and to maintain peace and security in those regions
of the world that are crucial for its vital interests. In principle,
this should be the least controversial of the pillars because it involves neither the promise of explicit benefits nor the carrying out
of explicit threats. In working this strategy, care must be taken
not to seek a monopoly over the outlets for speech lest we create
deep resentments among the very people we want to persuade.
The second prong of the grand strategy is intended to pick
up where general persuasion leaves off. It requires the United
States to offer direct, material support to specific political
groups and, more generally, to make financial and security
commitments to induce other nations to cooperate with it in international affairs. In essence, the United States cannot expect
to demand any case-by-case quid pro quo whereby for each advantage that it confers on its allies and trading partners, it receives something of a like kind in exchange. Rather, what the
United States wants from its trading partners is their durable
support and cooperation, in a setting in which immediate tangible benefits are but one part of a far larger picture.
To understand how inducement fits into the overall scheme,
it is useful to refer to the late Professor Gary Becker’s “‘rotten
kid’ theorem,” articulated in his article A Theory of Social Interactions.6 Becker’s theorem assumes, in its simplest form, a family of three, in which the head of the family, well-endowed with
resources, takes into account the welfare of two children, each of
whom is by assumption totally indifferent to the welfare of the
other.7 The theorem postulates that by withholding or granting
benefits to the two children, the parent can make them act “as if

6
7

Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J Polit Econ 1063, 1076–83 (1974).
Id at 1076–78.
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they love[ ]” one another, even if they do not.8 The hard question
therefore is how to identify the particular settings in which the
rotten-kid theorem is likely to hold.
Within the family context, Becker’s view is unduly pessimistic because, biologically speaking, it wrongly presupposes that
there are no bonds of affection between the children that make
them want to cooperate even in the absence of their parents. The
theorem holds strong in the international arena, however. Consider the Sunni-Shiite conflict throughout the Middle East and
particularly in Iraq, where indifference is displaced by active
enmity.9 The only way to make both sides cooperate is by making bribes that are sufficiently large to prevent each faction from
targeting members of the other group. Killing or arresting any
one person does not end the conflict, as it would in Becker’s nuclear family. It only spurs a further cycle of revenge and suicide
killings. The superpower pays those inducements willingly because the conflict between the two sides, including its repercussions on third parties, is more costly than the bribes.
Events in Iraq between 2007 and 2011 illustrate this point.
Like the head of a family, a world power has to broker deals between parties who might otherwise kill each other—a function
the United States performed reasonably well between the 2007
surge and the end of the Iraq War in 2008, when General David
Petraeus paid Sunni tribes to stand with the United States
against al Qaeda.10 Matters started to deteriorate between 2009
and the withdrawal of US forces in 2011.11 The decision of the
Obama administration to condition future US support on the
prior willingness of local factions to cooperate betrays a deep
confusion of cause and effect, for as we saw in the early years of
the Obama presidency, the local factions will cooperate, for the
moment, only if they can be sure of US support.12 As with all
8

Id at 1080.
See, for example, Zoe Mintz, How the Sunni-Shiite Conflict Frames the Current
Crisis in Iraq (International Business Times, June 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/9LJS-CXWU.
10 See Reuel Marc Gerecht, Hope and Change in Iraq (The Weekly Standard, Mar 22,
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/8M97-D5QX (“But in Iraqi Shiite eyes what Washington
has been doing since the surge began in 2007—when General David Petraeus started
paying Sunni tribes to stand against al Qaeda and with the Americans—is bribing the
Sunnis to behave.”).
11 See Pete Hegseth, Iraq’s Disintegration (National Review, June 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H72B-ZD9D.
12 See Dexter Filkins, What We Left Behind (New Yorker, Apr 28, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/VV5F-5C8Q (“When the last American soldiers left Iraq, at the end of
9
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contractual arrangements, matters of sequential performance
are critical, and some transactions will not take place unless
someone can underwrite the risks for the parties involved.13
The third pillar of foreign policy is coercion backed by the
credible threat of force against those who are not brought into
line by the first two strategies. This approach will surely fail if
the first two steps have not succeeded at reducing the arena in
which force should be exercised. But even if they are successful,
they will ultimately be made credible only if we are prepared to
use force, both alone and with our allies, to defend our friends
and to attack our enemies. It was a careful combination of these
three elements that accounted for the success of the surge under
the command of Petraeus.14 It should go without saying that the
ability to implement this three-part strategy overseas requires a
coherent and stable foreign policy consensus at home.
The case for coercion follows from the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and John Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government. The great challenge of this pillar is to
eliminate the physical and emotional insecurities that arise
from the unbridled use of force in human affairs. Hobbes cemented his position in the pantheon of political theory by noting
that in the state of nature, “the life of man, [is] solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short.”15 In the state of nature, all evident
differences in strength do not matter.16 The strongest has to
sleep, at which point the weakest, or a confederation of the
weakest, can slay him with impunity.17 The rough equality
among men necessarily means that no one person gains any security by going it alone.18 But what happens when people band
together for voluntary protection? No doubt these alliances will
help, but their promise is unfulfilled so long as even one person
(let alone one nation) is prepared to operate with force outside
2011, the bloody civil war between the country’s Sunni and Shiite sects had been stifled but
not resolved. Now the sectarian violence had returned, with terrifying intensity.”).
13 For an illustration of the importance of risk underwriters for the sequential performance of contracts, see Wisconsin Knife Works v National Metal Crafters, 781 F2d
1280, 1285 (7th Cir 1986).
14 For Petraeus’s account of how a “comprehensive strategy” worked, see David
Petraeus, How We Won in Iraq (Foreign Policy, Oct 29, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/N75T-ULK8. His prophecy has surely proved correct.
15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 89 (Cambridge 1991) (Richard Tuck, ed) (originally
published 1651).
16 See id at 86–87.
17 See id at 87.
18 See id at 87–88.
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the common framework that has been accepted by everyone else.
That one person can pose a mortal threat to all others. Making a
bargain with that one person may ease the short-term worry,
but it will not cure the problem. That initial bribe will tempt at
least one other person to adopt that hostile strategy and pick up
where the original assailant left off. A succession of purchases
can bankrupt the virtuous, but it cannot win the peace. Only
force can combat force.
Couched in somewhat more modern terminology, there is a
huge transaction cost obstacle facing any group of virtuous individuals that are trying to buy their way out of threats from the
few. This somber conclusion does not depend on the relentless
Hobbesian assumption that every person is driven by greed and
self-interest.19 Quite the opposite: so long as some tiny fraction of
the population has that tendency, peace and social stability will
quickly fall apart even if everyone else wants to cooperate to secure them.
Only counterforce against the intransigent outsider can secure social peace. If the majority can succeed in squelching the
initial threat, the next person will hesitate before he takes the
same aggressive posture. The initial victory allows the dominant
group to consolidate its position and thus be better positioned to
deal with subsequent threats. That victory ends the cycle of surrender and allows the game to come to successful closure.
Or does it? As Hobbes well understood, using force to combat
force has all the dangers of playing with fire, for a dominant
power can also use its power to suppress its legitimate adversaries and not only to defend its citizens.20 Still, Hobbes put his
faith in the single, dominant sovereign.21 But as Locke pointed
out, that consolidation of power creates a great risk to citizens’
lives, safety, and property if their sovereign turns evil.22 It is a
19 See Hobbes, Leviathan at 105 (cited in note 15) (“For no man giveth, but with
intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the
Object is to every man his own Good.”).
20 See id at 148 (giving examples of rulers using sovereign authority to execute innocent subjects).
21 Id at 120:

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them
from . . . the injuries of one another . . . is, to conferre all their power and
strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all
their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will.
22 For a discussion of the danger of consolidated, absolute power and an implicit critique of Hobbes’s sovereign, see John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 50 (Hackett
1980) (C.B. Macpherson, ed) (originally published 1689).
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melancholy truth that more people—think Nazi Germany,23
Stalinist Russia,24 Pol Pot’s Cambodia,25 and so on—are killed by
governments than by roving bands of bandits.
Yet these unfortunate historical events do not justify giving
up the effort to form a viable state. To be sure, anarchy has its
dogged defenders,26 and the Hayekian principle of “spontaneous
order” has gained more intellectual traction in political theory
and commercial relations than it deserves.27 Perhaps some small
communities engage in self-organization that tends to prove stable over time. But these claims are sharply bounded by two considerations. First, community arrangements invariably take
hold within a larger state: the gold miners who developed a system of property rights were backstopped by state power in most
of their relations with other individuals.28 Second, informal
norms have to be backed by force against interlopers and outsiders who challenge those basic norms. Hence this fundamental
dilemma. Develop no controlling power and private violence
flourishes, which will usually impede human cooperation, even if
it does not snuff it out altogether.29
Yet the alternative is worse. If good people in society choose,
by hypothesis, to do nothing to quell violence, their passivity will
23

See R.J. Rummel, Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder 11 (Transaction 1992).
See Palash Ghosh, How Many People Did Joseph Stalin Kill? (International
Business Times, Mar 5, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GE6P-X9YT (citing historians
on this issue).
25 See Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia
under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79 48 (Yale 2d ed 2002).
26 See, for example, Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance
Works Better Than You Think 1–4 (Cambridge 2014); Michael Huemer, The Problem of
Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey 334–38
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
27 For one late expression of the ideal of “spontaneous order,” see F.A. Hayek, Play,
the School of Rules, in W.W. Bartley III, ed, 1 The Collected Works of Friedrich August
Hayek: The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of Socialism 154, 154 (Routledge 1988) (“A game is
indeed a clear instance of a process wherein obedience to common rules by elements pursuing different and even conflicting purposes results in overall order.”). For an application of this ideal to international politics, see Edwin van de Haar, Hayekian Spontaneous
Order and the International Balance of Power, 16 Indep Rev 101, 105–09 (2011).
28 See John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial
Distribution of Property Rights, 19 Econ Inquiry 38, 41 (1981) (suggesting that economic
theory necessarily assumes away anarchy because it assumes that each individual has
the legal right to some resource).
29 For exhaustive documentation of the endemic violence internally among the gold
rush miners, Maine lobster fishermen, and cattle ranchers, see Stephen Clowney, Rule of
Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U Ill L Rev 59, 69–81
(critiquing economists’ assumption that informal private ordering avoids anarchy and
private violence).
24
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clear the way for competing militias to occupy center stage,
catching many innocent people in the cross fire. In the resulting
confusion, one frightening possibility is that one aggressive
group, perhaps held together by family or religious ties, could
become strong enough to become a state by wresting away territorial control from everyone else.30 That state would embody the
Hobbesian nightmare, because it would owe nothing to most of
the people who lived under its rule.31 In practice, the no-state option is in fact a delusion. The only real question is who runs the
state: relatively virtuous members of the polity, or rogues and
despots. But it is precisely because most human beings are not
Hobbesian monsters that all people are not necessarily condemned to live under tyranny and deprivation. There are more
people who hate violence than those who want to practice it.32 It
is they who must organize. In a democracy, median voters more
or less call the tune, so long as they remain in control.33 But the
tendency for disruption is always present. W.B. Yeats said it all
too well: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of
passionate intensity.”34 Think of the United States versus Iran.35
Unfortunately, social contract theory does not offer any unique
prescriptions on either of the two major challenges for any government—namely, what the government’s basic structure is and
what basic rights (if any) this structure wishes to secure.
This combination of persuasion, inducements, and force can
work well. It was the model for the 1978 Camp David Accords,36
30 See Kareem Shaheen, Isis ‘Controls 50% of Syria’ after Seizing Historic City of
Palmyra (The Guardian, May 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/J9AY-UVES.
31 See Tim Allen, Violence and Moral Knowledge: Observing Social Trauma in Sudan
and Uganda, 13 Camb J Anthro 45, 47 (special issue 1988).
32 See David P. Barash, Is There a War Instinct? (Aeon, Sept 19, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/V7M8-4LTR (“[E]ven as warfare is new to the human experience and therefore liable to be culturally induced . . . behavioural systems of restraint are old, shared by
numerous animal species, and therefore likely to be deep-seated in our nature.”).
33 See Michael B. Gibilisco, John N. Mordeson, and Terry D. Clark, Fuzzy Black’s
Median Voter Theorem: Examining the Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference, 8
New Math & Nat Computation 195, 195–96 (2012). See also generally Duncan Black, On
the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J Polit Econ 23 (1948).
34 W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming (1921), in W.B. Yeats, Later Poems 346, 346
(Macmillan 1922).
35 See Evan Moore, A Deal Based on Trust, Not Verification (US News & World Report, July 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/64EZ-MB9N (suggesting that the Obama
administration’s “stunning concessions” in nuclear negotiations will instigate Iran’s defiance of nonproliferation standards).
36 See generally A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David,
17 ILM 1466 (1978); Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and
Israel, 17 ILM 1470 (1978).
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which brought peace between Israel and Egypt and ended the era
of major Arab-Israeli wars.37 It is also critical to see what happens
when that strategy is not followed. The 2003 invasion of Iraq
triggered a global debate over the legality of preventive war.38 The
ensuing occupation floundered due to the administration’s failure
to properly execute the postinvasion plan that had actually been
approved by President George W. Bush. The de-Baathification
and disbanding of the Iraqi Army were symptoms of this failure.39 The 2007 surge then vanquished the insurgency and
brought a fragile peace to that long-suffering country through a
consistent policy that involved the heavy use of force combined
with two persuasive devices that were intended to win the support of the local citizenry. The first was the public promise of
long-term commitment.40 The second involved particular inducements, continuously supplied, to persuade Iraq’s political
factions to cooperate with each other.41
Yet the policy was consciously repudiated when President
Barack Obama took office in 2009.42 With the shift in administration, the conscious end of Pax Americana has led to endless
suffering and extended conflicts that show no sign of abating.43
The breakdown in Iraq is well-nigh complete: Tikrit and Mosul
are in ISIS hands.44 Ramadi fell, only to be recaptured after it
had been reduced to ruins.45 Baghdad remains within easy reach
of ISIS.46 While the United States remained in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, pursued a program of cautious
37 See Office of the Historian, Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Department of State, Oct 31, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/X5M5-4RYB.
38 Compare, for example, William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 Notre Dame L Rev
1365, 1372 (2004), with Neta C. Crawford, The Slippery Slope to Preventive War, 17 Ethics & Intl Aff 30, 31 (2003).
39 See generally James P. Pfiffner, US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and
Disbanding the Army, 25 Intell & Natl Sec 76 (2010).
40 See Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the
Remaking of the Iraq War 268 (Yale 2013).
41 See id.
42 See Danielle Pletka, What Obama Has Wrought in Iraq (US News & World Report, June 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/96KD-HC44.
43 For one of the many accounts of the power void, see id.
44 See id.
45 Zach Noble, ‘Ramadi Has Fallen’: Islamic State Just Captured a Critical Iraqi
City, Officials Say (The Blaze, May 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/97U6-5DMF.
See also Kareem Shaheen, Iraq Celebrates Recapture of Ramadi but Victory Comes at a
Cost (The Guardian, Dec 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2PBK-TQ4F.
46 See Kevin Carroll, How to Prevent the Fall of Baghdad (Wall St J, May 26, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/E5L8-BDJK.
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accommodation with the Sunnis and worked within limits to
maintain the operation of shared power within a broadly democratic framework.47 The task of reconciliation is far from complete. There is little doubt that the United States did badly in
the immediate aftermath of the invasion under the leadership of
Paul Bremer, but after the 2007 surge it gained ground with
forceful coordinated actions.48 Matters were moving in a positive
direction when Obama took office in 2009 and it became clear that
the long-term commitment to Iraq was beginning to erode.49 The
situation came to a head when Obama withdrew all American
forces at the end of 2011, ignoring the advice of commanders and
the private pleas of senior Iraqi leaders.50
Consider this chain of events. On December 14, 2011,
Obama announced the departure of US troops from Iraq, with
the promise that he would leave behind “a sovereign, stable and
self reliant Iraq with a representative government that was
elected by its people.”51 On December 18, 2011, the United
States withdrew its last ground forces from Iraq.52 On December
19, 2011, al-Maliki, who had ruled uneasily for ten years, had an
arrest warrant issued for Iraq’s Sunni Vice President Tariq alHashimi on charges of supporting terrorism.53 Why that result?
With the middleman gone, al-Maliki’s calculations were easy. If
there was a barely tenuous coexistence when the United States
was present in force, there could be no deal once the United
States left. So he struck first, because he could be toppled.

47 See Reidar Visser, Iraq’s New Government and the Question of Sunni Inclusion
(Combating Terrorism Center, Sept 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/62N3-CT86.
48 See Pfiffner, 25 Intell & Natl Sec at 76–79 (cited in note 39); Mansoor, Surge at
268 (cited in note 40).
49 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper, Obama Adds Troops, but Maps Exit
Plan (NY Times, Dec 1, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/JZX8-W7Y6. But see Zeke J.
Miller, Obama Says U.S. Will Bomb ISIS in Syria, Train Rebels (Time, Sept 10, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/HFW4-7BKP.
50 See Mario Loyola, My Iraqi Friend and the Obama Betrayal (Wall St J, May 29,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8TZY-Q2LZ; Filkins, What We Left Behind (cited in
note 12).
51 Chris McGreal, Barack Obama Declares Iraq War a Success (The Guardian, Dec
14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9XX6-673G.
52 Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War (Reuters, Dec 18, 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/H85B-B3CF.
53 Jack Healy, Arrest Order for Sunni Leader in Iraq Opens New Rift (NY Times,
Dec 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B7E4-TWU6.

100

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:89

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, the principal
means of enforcing a sovereign state’s rights (including the right
of self-defense) was self-help.54 The Charter eliminated that option through the virtually blanket prohibition of Article 2(4),
without creating any credible enforcement mechanism to take
its place—thus leaving individual states free to use force only in
self-defense (and even then only “if an armed attack occurs”).55
As typically construed, the Charter also allows for the use of
force if an attack is imminent, an instructive example of notable
agreement that a treaty cannot possibly mean what it actually
says.56 But many mortal threats require preventive self-defense
long before an attack is imminent. It is all too easy to remember
cases in which democracies have failed to react quickly enough
to looming danger; indeed, that was the principal lesson of the
events that led to World War II.57 As Prime Minister Winston
Churchill put it in his “Iron Curtain” speech of 1946, “There
never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action
than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the
globe.”58 By contrast, America fared far better at the start of the
Cold War by defining a strategic defensive perimeter in Europe
and along the Pacific Rim and by developing a strategy of containing the Soviet Union outside that perimeter.59
54 See W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International
Law, 10 Yale J Intl L 279, 279 (1985).
55 UN Charter Art 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
56 See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military
Force, 26 Wash Q 89, 91–93 (Spring 2003) (contrasting “restrictionist” commentators
who interpret Article 51 as authorizing self-defense only in instances in which an armed
attack has actually occurred with “counter-restrictionists” who interpret Article 51 as
permitting anticipatory self-defense).
57 See Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming
of World War II 4 (Dee 1999).
58 Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, in Randolph S. Churchill, ed, The
Sinews of Peace: Post-war Speeches 93, 104 (Houghton Mifflin 1949).
59 See Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? at 17–58 (cited in note 1).
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The Truman Doctrine,60 the treaties of alliance with NATO
and key Pacific Rim countries,61 and the strategy of containment62
were the pillars of US strategy in the Cold War. The Soviet veto
at the UN Security Council meant that the UN could not serve as
a credible vehicle for containing Soviet ambitions, which enhanced
the importance of NATO and the Pacific Rim alliances.63 These
developments were virtually universally accepted throughout
the free world and quickly became deeply institutionalized both
within America’s domestic constitutional order and internationally.64 But at key points, the grand strategy was in potential conflict with the law of the UN Charter.65 As a result, the United
States and its major allies have paid lip service to the rules of
the Charter, but their actual foreign policy has deviated widely
from the Charter’s rules.
In this context, consider the US actions in the Cuban quarantine66 and Israel’s attacks on nuclear reactors in Iraq in 198167 and
Syria in 2007.68 All of these actions were technically illegal under
the Charter, but the international community widely accepted

60 See id at 21–24 (discussing the gradual development of Truman-era grand strategy during the early years of the Cold War).
61 See, for example, Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System
in Asia, 34 Intl Sec 158, 158–59 (2010).
62 See Hugh Ross, ed, The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics 2–19 (Rand
McNally 1963).
63 See North Atlantic Treaty, TIAS No 1964, 34 UNTS 243 (1949). The key guarantee in Article 5 of the Treaty begins: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all.” Id at 246. Article 5 then calls for collective action permissible under Article 51 of the
UN Charter and agrees to report these matters to the Security Council, with this caveat:
“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace
and security.” Id. Note that if the Security Council does nothing, NATO continues to act.
64 See generally Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948–1951 (Department of Defense 1980).
65 See, for example, Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur J Intl L 1, 3–4 (1999) (noting that Article 51 of the UN Charter was subject
to “gross” misinterpretations during the Cold War).
66 For background information on the Cuban quarantine, see Office of the Historian, The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 (Department of State, Oct 31, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/WG37-M3SY.
67 For further discussion of Israel’s 1981 attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor, see
1981: Israel Bombs Baghdad Nuclear Reactor (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/XWC2
-G674.
68 For additional information on Israel’s 2007 attack on a Syrian nuclear site, see
David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say
(NY Times, Oct 14, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/Q5N8-GAM6.
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them either at the time or afterward.69 Some will say that customary international law, which is based on state practices and international acceptance, has enshrined the right of remote prevention—that is, the prevention of attacks that are not imminent.70
But that position is hardly universally accepted. Indeed, it is certainly rejected by a majority of scholars and diplomats.71
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson put the matter in
the proper light during congressional hearings in the aftermath
of the Cuban Missile Crisis:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine
is not a legal issue. The power, position and prestige of the
United States had been challenged by another state; and law
simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power—
power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty. I cannot
believe that there are principles of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life. One would be surprised if
practical men, trained in legal history and thought, had devised and brought to a state of general acceptance a principle
condemnatory of an action so essential to the continuation of
pre-eminent power as that taken by the United States last
October. Such a principle would be as harmful to the development of restraining procedures as it would be futile. No
law can destroy the state creating the law.72
This inescapably correct insight was contradicted as recently as July 23, 2015, when Secretary of State John Kerry told the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that US strikes against
Iran’s nuclear program have no basis under international law so
long as other parties continue to observe the Iran nuclear deal.73
Under this agreement (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan
69 For international acceptance of the Cuban quarantine, see Monica Hakimi, To
Condone or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council
Authorization, 40 Vand J Transnatl L 643, 653–59 (2007). For a contrasting account
showing international acceptance of Israel’s actions in 1981 and 2007, see Leonard S.
Spector and Avner Cohen, Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime, 38 Arms Control Today 15, 16–18 (July/Aug 2008).
70 See Arend, 26 Wash Q at 90 (cited in note 56).
71 See, for example, Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 San Diego Intl L J 7, 10–11,
14–15 (2003).
72 Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 Proceedings Am Socy Intl L 13, 14
(1963) (emphasis added).
73 See Kaine Questions Secretaries Kerry, Moniz & Lew at Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iran Nuclear Deal (Tim Kaine, July 23, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/K78U-3F73.
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of Action), all international economic sanctions against Iran are to
be lifted early in exchange for minimal steps on Iran’s part, after
which the sanctions will be virtually impossible to reinstate if—
or, more likely, when—the Iranians are in breach.74 The nuclear
agreement has many flaws, but its most fatal one is the fact that
it does not deal with the threat posed by Iran, which inheres not
solely in the nuclear program but also in the ideology and the
very nature of the regime.
It is not possible to run a nuclear-nonproliferation regime, or
a stable world order, on the basis of a principle of “sovereign
equality” that deems democratic institutions no better than those
of dictatorships or state sponsors of terrorism.75 This approach
necessarily cedes to all nations the ability to obtain nuclear
weapons for their own use (whether purely defensive or as an
added deterrent to reinforce the projection of hegemonic power).
We can see that trend right now, for if Iran is to have the nuclear
bomb, then so too will Saudi Arabia, and so on down the line.76
Any ability to stop nuclear proliferation depends on the strong
American guarantee. Indeed, matters go sharply in reverse when
the UN becomes the forum for international affairs. Its key disability is that it starts with the fantastically antidemocratic notion
of parity among nations, with no standards for membership, in
the vain hope of establishing a “Parliament of Man.” That sweeping ambition undermines the UN’s more modest, proper role as
an aid to diplomacy, as the UN’s second secretary general, the
great Dag Hammarskjöld, wisely understood.77
It remains necessary to devise a doctrine for the establishment and evolution of international law, so that US policy can
conform to rules of the road that both discipline the exercise of
American power and enshrine the basic elements of an effective

74 See Barak Ravid, Nuclear Restrictions and Inspections in Exchange for Lifting of
Sanctions: The Details of the Iran Deal (Haaretz, July 14, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/75SZ-PNMS. For more-recent developments indicating potential breach, see
Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, Iran Tests Another Mid-range Ballistic Missile in
Breach of UN Resolutions (Fox News, Dec 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B4GQ-YQAH.
75 Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization, 53 Yale L J 207, 207–08 (1944).
76 See Yaroslav Trofimov, Saudi Arabia Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran
(Wall St J, May 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R7HL-3UUL.
77 See Dag Hammarskjöld, “The Element of Privacy in Peacemaking”: Address at
Ohio University *25–26 (UN, Feb 5, 1958), archived at http://perma.cc/3ULM-3C2A
(“There is an essential difference between the nation and the society of nations, each of
which remains individually sovereign. The United Nations General Assembly is patterned on a parliament but with power only to recommend not to legislate.”).
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grand strategy, and so that America can have a foreign policy
that is both effective and accepted as legitimate. The key lies in
the domestic institutions that must devise and maintain our foreign policy.
III. FOREIGN POLICY DEPENDS ON A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The complex internal-governance structure of the United
States is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the level of internal deliberation that leads to a coherent solution sends a
strong signal to the rest of the world that American policy is
well formulated. Hence, Senate consent to the North Atlantic
Treaty and to the Pacific Rim alliances has left little doubt about
America’s commitment to those allies.78 Yet by the same token,
strong divisions of opinion within the United States can sap its
ability to function well in international arenas, which has surely
been the case in recent years, with deep internal divisions over
the wisdom of American foreign policy and military initiatives.79
The challenge of democratic foreign policymaking was foreseen
by the Framers, who sought to protect the nation’s foreign policy
from the vagaries of public opinion while still ensuring the full
participation of democratic decisionmaking.80 No single branch
of government alone can devise a sustainable grand strategy.
The solution is institutional cooperation and institutionalization
of the policy itself.
Achieving global peace is difficult because it is necessary to
maneuver both domestic and foreign markets simultaneously.
The cardinal point is that, in the field of foreign policy, the practical need for broad bipartisan support for a lasting policy overwhelms any constitutional questions about the distribution of
congressional and presidential authority.81 Simply put, if a nation’s foreign policy has an acute separation of powers problem,

78 See, for example, George Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise?, 70
Colum L Rev 1, 42–47 (1970) (attributing US commitment to the development of NATO
in part to strong support and active participation from Congress).
79 See Douglas Kriner, Accountability without Deliberation? Separation of Powers
in Times of War, 95 BU L Rev 1275, 1291–95 (2015).
80 For a discussion on what the Framers had in mind regarding separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches over foreign affairs, see generally
H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40
Wm & Mary L Rev 1471 (1999).
81 See James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Bipartisanship, Partisanship,
and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947–1988, 52 J Polit
1077, 1077–79 (1990).
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the policy risks failure. An effective foreign policy must secure
lasting domestic and international support to create and sustain
long-term national commitments, especially under stress. Foreign policy must be institutionalized and shielded from changes
in administration, which in turn requires extensive congressional
involvement. Any effective international position requires that
the United States be able to make durable commitments to its allies, which includes mounting credible threats against aggressive
nations that want to prey on those allies. Such a strategy
requires a strong bipartisan commitment that can withstand
changes in political control.
Knowing that these commitments have to be durable to be
effective means that the United States must think long and hard
before deciding to intervene in any arena with either the use or
threat of force. But once that force has been committed, it is
dangerous business to precipitously withdraw in ways that necessarily create a power vacuum. A different administration may
well have chosen to make the initial decision differently. But
once the die is cast, any successor administration should keep
within the broad contours of the policies of its predecessors. It is
of course always necessary to execute midstream corrections,
and it may be possible to modify the level or direction of the
commitment. But there are limits, for these are the same kinds
of gradual changes that have to be made within any single administration. What an administration cannot do, at least successfully, is decide to pull out and leave a void in power, which
other players will rush to fill. There is, in a word, no easy or
quick exit option once previous commitments have been made—
a lesson that the Obama administration did not grasp until the
world saw the disastrous consequences of that hasty withdrawal
now unfolding across the Middle East and spreading throughout
Europe. Indeed, those errors have been compounded by the recent Russian military intervention in Syria, where US foreign
policy struggles to make incremental inroads against ISIS dominance and President Bashar al-Assad’s intransigence.82
The more theoretical question asks how to distribute power
under our Constitution to achieve that long-term end. In one
sense, the document was not drafted with this problem in mind,
because in 1787 it was inconceivable that the United States
82 For one possible response, see Max Boot and Michael Pregent, How Obama
Could Salvage His Hapless ISIS Strategy (Wall St J, Sept 30, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/PG3R-EN3F.
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would play a dominant role on the world stage.83 Nonetheless,
we think that the basic distribution of rights under our Constitution has hit on a permanent structure that today should work
as well as any other. The basic plan of the Constitution is akin
to a corporate model. Congress, as a two-member board of directors, sets general policies regarding funding and regulating the
disposition of the armed forces.84 It has the power to declare
war, and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.85 Although the point is easy to overlook, of the nineteen
enumerated powers in the Constitution, some seven clauses
grant specific powers to Congress over military and foreign affairs, and one (the Necessary and Proper Clause) intersects
profoundly with the operation of the others.86 At the same time,
much of Article I, §§ 9 and 10 limits the power of the states to
engage in foreign affairs—so that, in sharp contrast to the
European Union,87 foreign activities lie exclusively in the purview of the national government.88
The second piece of the puzzle is the executive power, which
gives the president both the right and the duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed.89 And therein lies the rub. There is
no way that anyone can draft a constitution that works well
with a weak executive in power. There is a simple reason why
corporations spend so much time and effort on the question of
succession of the CEO.90 From bitter experience, corporate
boards have learned that no set of institutional or charter restraints on the CEO can offset his personal weaknesses in the

83 See Matthew Spalding, America’s Founders and the Principles of Foreign Policy:
Sovereign Independence, National Interests, and the Cause of Liberty in the World (Heritage Foundation), archived at http://perma.cc/E6CZ-A75D (“At the time of its founding,
the United States was a weak and fledgling nation . . . extremely vulnerable to the great
powers that dominated the world.”).
84 See US Const Art I, § 8. See also Aaron Blake, Congressman: Members of Congress Are Underpaid (Wash Post, Apr 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6X4R-APPS
(quoting Representative Jim Moran as calling Congress “the board of directors for the
largest economic entity in the world”).
85 See US Const Art I, § 8, cls 10–11.
86 US Const Art I, § 8.
87 See Kristin Archick, The European Union: Questions and Answers *7 (Congressional Research Service, Sept 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6BJM-DC22.
88 See US Const Art I, §§ 9–10.
89 See US Const Art II, § 3.
90 For the importance of CEO succession, see generally Wei Shen and Albert A.
Cannella Jr, Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession: The Impacts of
Successor Type, Postsuccession Senior Executive Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure,
45 Academy Mgmt J 717 (2002).
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office or the weaknesses of the people whom he chooses to fill
subordinate positions. It is worth noting that the decision to remove former Baathists from virtually all government positions in
Iraq was apparently made not at the highest levels by either
Congress or the president, or even by Bremer in his capacity as
the administrator of the Iraqi Provisional Authority. We have
heard inconsistent accounts on whether Meghan O’Sullivan, a
deputy national-security adviser for Iraq, was for or against the
decision.91 But that is precisely the point. Once decisions go below
the highest level, they are opaque, and allocations of power between the president and Congress are of little operational importance. Whether one approves of de-Baathification is beside
the point. The key insight is that vital decisions are frequently
made by second-tier officials, often without direct oversight from
above.
The need for effective, quick, decisive action on the ground in
distant places is not a reason to oppose a constitutional system of
divided authority at home. In fact, the separation of powers is critical in the foreign policy arena. It is clear that the Constitution
makes a major effort to secure civilian control over the military
when it makes the president the commander in chief of the Army and Navy (and even the Air Force), as well as the militia
“when called into the actual Service of the United States.”92
Quite consciously, in calling up the militia the president cannot
act unilaterally but must depend on the prior action of Congress—which is yet another check on the president’s power.93
Note that textually, the president does not have any “commander in chief power”94 that goes side by side with his pardon power.95 Instead, this power is subject to the rules and regulations
that Congress makes under its Article I powers.96 As Alexander
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 69, the president in his role as
commander in chief is “much inferior” to the English king97 and

91 See, for example, L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope 40–49 (Simon & Schuster 2006); Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside
the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism 415–19, 464 (HarperCollins 2008).
92 US Const Art II, § 2.
93 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 15.
94 Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia
Clause, 34 Hofstra L Rev 317, 325 (2005).
95 See id at 327–28.
96 See id at 320–21.
97 Federalist 69 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 462, 465 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed):
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most notably does not possess the power to declare war or to act
outside the frame of reference set by Congress.98
Not only is Congress empowered to give its advice and consent to treaties and to provide for the regulation of the armed
forces but also—crucially—Congress is given the power to define
“Offences against the Law of Nations.”99 There is no reason to
think that the Framers intended this power to be limited to domestic law; they quite properly saw Congress as a vital source of
the country’s definition of international law itself.100
The administration of President Bush made a major mistake when it elected to define rules for the treatment of al Qaeda
detainees captured in the battlefield and for counterterrorism
operations without input from Congress. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005101—made necessary by damaging public controversy and adverse court rulings—did put to rest the separation of powers issue, but it left the procedural rights of the
detainees too vague for comfort.102 The Bush administration
should have sought to enshrine its policy in an act of Congress
from the very beginning to shield the policy from damaging controversy and to give the policy lasting impact.
One of the most vexatious elements of our constitutional
scheme is the operation of the treaty power. The constitutional
text is simple enough. Under Article II, § 2, the president “shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”103 That provision removes the House of Representatives
from the process and makes it appear that the president does
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King
of Great-Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King
extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration would appertain to the
Legislature.
It is worth noting that Hamilton also said that “the President is to be Commander in
Chief,” which is textually accurate and constitutionally instructive. Id.
98 See Epstein, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 324–25 (cited in note 94).
99 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10.
100 See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and
Punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations”, 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 447, 465–74 (2000).
101 Pub L No 109-148, 119 Stat 2739, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000dd
et seq.
102 See Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 19 Harv Hum Rts J
257, 260–65 (2006).
103 US Const Art II, § 2.
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not have unilateral power to enter into any treaty. By modern
sensibilities about political theory, the exclusion of only the
House, and not the Senate, seems archaic.104 In 1787, the indirect election of the Senate by the state legislatures may have
created the image that its sober judgment as the upper house
was most needed for international affairs. But now, with the direct election of the Senate,105 the sociological pedigree of the two
houses is much closer.
The Iran nuclear deal raises serious concerns about the
president’s ability to improperly skirt the Senate’s ratification
role in the treaty process.106 In the Iran negotiation, the president claimed that the resulting pact was an executive agreement, which did not constitute a treaty and hence could be entered into unilaterally by the president.107 Opponents argue that
no transaction this momentous should be done unilaterally by
the president, and they note by way of example that, unlike the
Iran nuclear deal, the Iraq War had the support of both Congress and the American people when it was launched.108 The dispute has generated furious disagreement, but where does it
leave us?
Against the common historical use of executive agreements,109 there is no reason as a matter of constitutional practice
why the Iran nuclear deal needed to be presented to the Senate
as a treaty because, as far the public documents reveal, it does
not require any changes in domestic law.110 The president had all
the waiver authority he needed under current sanctions to conclude the deal as an executive agreement, and with respect to
the UN sanctions, there is no way for Congress to constrain the
104 See Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 Yale L J
181, 186–89 (1945).
105 US Const Amend XVII.
106 See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Program (Council on
Foreign Relations, July 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JP2X-FH2E.
107 See Stephen Collinson, Iran Deal: A Treaty or Not a Treaty, That Is the Question
(CNN, Mar 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H99G-AVMJ.
108 See Dan Collins, Congress Says Yes to Iraq Resolution (CBS News, Oct 3, 2002),
archived at http://perma.cc/HBU5-DR6F.
109 See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 Cal L Rev 671, 722–61 (1998).
110 See John Yoo, Why Obama’s Executive Action on Iran Does Not Violate the Law
(National Review, July 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B6SM-LP5F (“Obamaadministration officials argue that the agreement need not take the treaty form because it
is not legally binding under international law. . . . Under this approach, though, the president who occupies the Oval Office in January 2017 can undo the deal with little delay.”).

110

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:89

president’s vote in the Security Council. On the other hand, by
not presenting the agreement as a treaty, the president has ensured that it will not be enshrined as a lasting policy. The fact
that the Iran nuclear deal is not binding for purposes of domestic
law is therefore a double-edged sword. Therein lies the failure of
not negotiating with Iran an agreement that could be ratified by
a two-thirds vote of the Senate. In the most charitable view, it is a
huge missed opportunity, because foreign policy is most successful when it is instituted on a bipartisan basis.111 The reverse of
that coin is that imposing any agreement of this importance on an
unwilling people without the support of Congress is both doomed
to fail and destined to prove damaging to vital US interests.
Compare the ratification of the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water112 (“Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”) with the negotiations
for the Iran nuclear deal. The former, a treaty with the Soviet
Union and Great Britain, was signed on August 5, 1963, and
thereafter ratified in the Senate on September 23, 1963, by a
vote of 80–19 before President John F. Kennedy signed the treaty, as ratified on October 7, 1963.113 The Limited Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty has now lasted over fifty years.114 The Iran negotiations have not followed that straightforward path. The Iran nuclear deal, with its multiple exit options, trap doors, and time
triggers for all parties, is unlikely to prove as enduring, especially given the lack of buy-in from Congress. Unfortunately, the
fact that it is not legally binding does not detract from its character as a fait accompli. It is far from clear how a future president’s decision to abrogate or modify the current agreement
would affect either actions that have already been taken under
it or our relations with other nations. The Iran nuclear deal appears to have been negotiated in such a way as to maximize the

111 For a general discussion of the effect of the Iran nuclear deal, see Bryan R. Gibson,
For All Parties Involved, the Iran Nuclear Deal Is a Big Win (London School of Economics, July 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P7T2-M5R8; Marguerite Ward, Iran Deal
Could Spark Arms Race—or Boost Trade (CNBC, July 10, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/Y7CK-TPA9.
112 TIAS No 5433, 480 UNTS 43 (1963).
113 See Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum), archived at http://perma.cc/58BT-MUM3.
114 Id.
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benefit to Iran and the harm to the United States that would
flow from a congressional disapproval.115
With respect to the president’s inherent power to use force as
commander in chief, the War Powers Resolution,116 adopted over
the veto of President Richard Nixon, demonstrates the difficulty
of setting out a unified program. The War Powers Resolution
sets out a series of timetables: The president must notify Congress within forty-eight hours after initiating the commitment of
US military forces to battle.117 There is an ostensible sixty-day
period in which force may be maintained, followed by a thirtyday withdrawal period.118 Presidents have generally complied
with the Resolution’s provisions, even while affirming its unconstitutionality.119 It is likely that President Bill Clinton skirted
these provisions in initiating his bombing campaign in Kosovo in
1999.120 President Obama, reversing earlier practice, insisted on
the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution121 and then
explicitly ignored its requirements when he committed American
airpower in Libya—a disastrous intervention that once again
shows the dangers of half measures that are undertaken abroad
without a strong domestic consensus behind the strategy.122 The
unfortunate impasse over the War Powers Resolution is that its
uncertain constitutional and political statuses exacerbate rather
than salve the separation of powers problems of American foreign policy.
The dangers from the Nixon era have carried over recently,
as the United States continues to dither in response to the
threat that ISIS poses in the Middle East. The weakness of the
American response shows as a simple matter of international relations the massive risk of a policy that allows for the use of air

115 For a discussion of the concessions made by the United States during the negotiation stage, see James Phillips, No Deal Still Better Than a Bad Deal on Iran Nukes
(The Daily Signal, June 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZDK-AWN8.
116 Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), codified as amended at 50 USC § 1541 et seq.
117 50 USC § 1543(a).
118 50 USC § 1544(b).
119 See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 Va
L Rev 101, 104 (1984).
120 See Andrew D. LeMar, War Powers: What Are They Good For?: Congressional
Disapproval of the President’s Military Actions and the Merits of a Congressional Suit
against the President, 78 Ind L J 1045, 1052–53 (2003).
121 See Conor Friedersdorf, 3 Ways Obama Expanded War Powers Well beyond
George W. Bush (Defense One, Nov 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P4HX-E7WC.
122 See Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role
in Libya Operation (NY Times, June 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/2V5G-ZTRZ.

112

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:89

forces, but not ground forces, in combat. The airpower is significant enough to have political implications, but it is not able to
decisively reshape the strategic reality on the ground. Airpower
alone can be effective in a coercive diplomacy mode, as Clinton
demonstrated when the 1999 Kosovo action ended in the Dayton
Peace Accords.123 But the Obama administration is obviously not
trying to bring ISIS to the negotiating table and, in any case, the
administration does not appear to believe in coercive diplomacy
to start with, as demonstrated by its supine acceptance of virtually all of Iran’s opening negotiation positions in the Iran nuclear deal.124
Obama’s half measures show the failure to apprehend the
dangers of weak military leadership and confused grand strategy. Of course, he has plenty of support. For example, Professor
Harold Koh, Obama’s former State Department legal adviser,
has written in support of a resolution that would both
(1) “authorize the president to use such force against ISIL . . . as
is necessary and appropriate to achieve agreed-upon, defined
strategic objectives” for at most two years, geographically limited to Iraq and Syria and operationally limited to no US ground
forces; and (2) narrow or repeal the 2001 al Qaeda and 2002 Iraq
Authorizations for Use of Military Force125 before leaving office if
the al Qaeda conflict recedes.126 Koh supported this view by virtue of the fact that it will place the US military intervention on
firmer legal ground while simultaneously allowing the United
States to take the nation off its war footing.127 And indeed, the
president did not seek explicit authorization to root out ISIS
from the Middle East.128 Unfortunately, this approach to the use
of force is dead wrong. Most likely, the practical effect and intended purpose of the Resolution were not to authorize force but
to deauthorize it and bequeath the deauthorization to the next
president. That proposal is designed not to put possible military
123 For the successes and problems of the coercive use of air force in the Kosovo action, see generally Scott A. Cooper, Air Power and the Coercive Use of Force, 24 Wash Q
81 (Autumn 2001).
124 See Phillips, No Deal Still Better Than a Bad Deal (cited in note 115).
125 See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L No 107-140, 115
Stat 224 (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub L No 107-243, 116 Stat 1498 (2002).
126 Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawful Way to Fight the Islamic State (Politico Magazine, Aug 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3LHG-RQJK.
127 Id.
128 See Russell Berman, The War against ISIS Will Go Undeclared (The Atlantic,
Apr 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W8XX-8NAM.
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action against ISIS on firmer footing but rather to complicate
the legal issue for future presidents.
There is no reason to precommit a future president to a version of future events that may never occur. No one can say for
sure whether the war in Iraq or Syria will spread to Libya,
Yemen, or Pakistan, or even to other places as yet unknown.
There was no reason to think when the resolution was first proposed that this conflict could be wrapped up within eighteen
months. Instead, a resolution to that effect signals weaknesses
to our enemies and reduces one serious element of uncertainty
in the way in which they wish to formulate their plans. Nor did
it make sense, then or now, to bar the use of ground forces. At a
minimum, these forces can improve the accuracy of the air war.
More than that, they can stiffen through good leadership the
Iraqi elements that are involved in the struggle by putting back
on the table a set of inducements that might be able to foster cooperation among the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. When the president takes to the air, he tells the American people “what the
United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and
ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL.”129
“Ultimately” can take a long time, assuming that the nation
does not tire of a half venture that has produced few visible results. Nor is “ultimately” ever likely to occur, so long as the administration does not grasp the essentials of the rotten-kid theorem and instead insists that additional US action depends on
Iraqi formation of an inclusive government, which remains a
perilous operation.130 The Iraqi government is, of course, in disarray.131 For each day that the United States occupies a marginal role, it becomes harder to correct for past errors. It is commonplace to attack American policy in Iraq as a trillion-dollar
blunder, and in an odd sense it has turned out that way.132 But
the explanation lies not in that we intervened too much but rather in that, after the military successes of 2003, we did too little
to execute the tripartite strategy of persuasion, inducements,
and force, which was belatedly put into place only during the
129 Statement by the President on ISIL (The White House, Sept 10, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/F9GV-XMA8.
130 See Josh Rogin, U.S. Helped Push Iraq’s Politics to a Breaking Point, and
Now Is Pushing Maliki Out (The Daily Beast, Aug 11, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/R5EQ-QTEY.
131 See id.
132 See Sarwar Kashmeri, Iraq—a Trillion Dollars Worth of Nothing (Huffington
Post, Dec 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/2HV4-TWM2.
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surge. The losses that followed were more attributable to a weak
intervention than to a strong one.
CONCLUSION
So as the issue now stands, what can be done? Whether the
issue deals with either Iraq or Iran, we do not think that there is
any institutional fix that can handle the question so long as the
president—and, to some extent, Congress—is committed to a
policy that downplays the critical leadership role of American
foreign policies, even in the face of the increasing instability in
the Middle East and elsewhere. But in the large scheme of
things, we think that two points do become clear.
First, the difficulties that we face as a nation are not in large
measure attributable to our constitutional structure, which sets
an appropriate framework for dealing with matters of war and
peace. The system of separation of powers can produce better deliberations and focused action that can then legitimate American
leadership in the rest of the world. Note that, in making this
claim, we use the word “appropriate” and not some stronger term
like “effective” or “definitive”—owing to the complexity of the situation, this stronger objective is simply unattainable when set
out in general terms. James Madison famously said in Federalist
10 that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm,”
so the Constitution must be drafted in a way to cope with the
dangers that factionalism poses to the nation.133 But it is critical
to note the problems to which that remark was addressed: debtor
relief, restrictions on foreign manufacturers, and the apportionment of taxes—all of which are matters on which some structural
constraints are workable.134 Think of Article I, § 8, which limits
the power to tax to matters that concern the debt, the common
defense, or the general welfare of the United States,135 and understand that the last clause is not an open invitation to tax for
whatever purpose Congress may desire.136 Think also of Article I,
§ 10, which states that no state shall make any law “impairing
the Obligation of Contracts.”137
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Second, interpretive fixes of this sort are regrettably unavailable for foreign policy matters when the sound exercise of
both congressional and presidential power is critical above and
beyond the constitutional text. We see no way in which the
United States’ foreign policy endeavors can be successful—even
if we have an ideal constitutional structure—unless we also
have leaders in both branches of government, as well as many
members of the public at large, who understand the basic commitments necessary to allow the United States to succeed. Our
power in large measure is the response to the soundness of our
permanent government structures. In a hostile and ugly world,
moral relativism that dwells on America’s past sins will not set
the right tone for public debate. It will not do for President
Obama to invoke the sins of Christian crusaders when asked
about the ISIS atrocities.138 Unless we still believe in American
exceptionalism and Pax Americana, we cannot make the kinds
of durable commitments that will allow decent people to put
their trust in us and others to fear the consequences of our
wrath.
To be sure, statements of this sort bespeak (especially in
light of the dismal performance of recent years) a certain level of
arrogance. But what is the alternative? The wholesale slaughter
of innocent people caught in the cross fire between roving bands
of, or subject to the thumbs of, ugly tyrants. No, we cannot be
the universal policemen for the world, but neither can we abdicate our responsibilities because, frankly, there is no one else
out there who can take our place.

138 See Evan Simon, Historians Weigh In on Obama’s Comparison of ISIS Militants
to Medieval Christian Crusaders (ABC News, Feb 6, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/HN5B-L4P8 (quoting Obama as stating: “Lest we get on our high horse
and think this is unique to some other place, remember that during the Crusades and
the Inquisition, people committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ”).

